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PREVIEW: City of Helena v. O’Connell: Double Jeopardy and 




Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, January 23, 
2019, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme 




The sole issue before the Court is whether the Helena 
Municipal Court violated Petitioner Kristi Anne O’Connell’s 
(“O’Connell”) double jeopardy protections under Montana Code 
Annotated § 46–11–504(1).1  
Prior prosecution of an offense in any jurisdiction bars 
subsequent prosecution if the first prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal or a conviction and the subsequent prosecution arose “out 
of the same transaction.”2 Two charges arise out of the same 
transaction if the conduct for both offenses is motivated by a 
purpose to accomplish a criminal objective, and the conduct is 
necessary or incidental to accomplishing that objective.3  
O'Connell's appeal provides the Court with an opportunity to 
reconsider whether strict liability offenses, such as driving under 
the influence (“DUI”), can ever arise out of the same transaction as 
other offenses. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On June 3, 2016, Helena police officers cited O’Connell with 
careless driving for causing a multiple-vehicle accident.4 
O’Connell told the responding officer she missed a turn and was 
looping back when the accident occurred.5 O’Connell could not 
remember how the accident happened, but she accepted 
                                                     
* Christine Hutchison, a 2019 juris doctor candidate at the Alexander 
Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, appeared on behalf of 
the City of Helena in Municipal Court while interning for the Lewis and Clark 
County Attorney’s Office in 2018; however, she was not involved with the 
O’Connell case in any capacity. 
1 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–11–504(1) (2017). 
2 Id. 
3 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–2–101(23). 
4 Appellee’s Response Brief at 2, City of Helena v. O’Connell, 
https://perma.cc/NL2X-UCRJ (Mont. Sept. 4, 2018) (No. DA 17-0440); 
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1–2, City of Helena v. O’Connell, 
https://perma.cc/68UT-Z6HK (Mont. June 4, 2018) (No. DA 17-0440). 
5 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 4, at 2.  
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responsibility.6 She also told the officer she took several prescribed 
medications and O’Connell agreed to provide a blood sample.7 The 
officer cited O'Connell with careless driving, and O'Connell 
pleaded guilty in Municipal Court within a week.8 
The Helena City Attorney’s Office received the toxicology 
report identifying four different medications in O’Connell’s blood 
on August 22, 2016.9 In October of 2016, the Helena City 
Attorney's Office charged O'Connell with DUI.10 O’Connell 
moved to dismiss the DUI as arising under the same transaction as 
the careless driving charge, and thus violating Montana’s double-
jeopardy protections.11 The court denied the motion.12 O’Connell 
pleaded guilty to the amended charge of negligent endangerment, 
reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to dismiss.13 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
O’Connell argues the City of Helena violated double-jeopardy 
protections under § 46–11–504(1).14 A subsequent prosecution 
violates the statute if: (1) the defendant’s conduct constitutes an 
equivalent offense in both the jurisdiction where the first 
prosecution occurred and the jurisdiction where the subsequent 
prosecution is pursued; (2) the first prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal or a conviction; and (3) the subsequent prosecution was 
“based on an offense arising out of the same transaction.”15 The 
parties agree the first two prongs are satisfied, and solely dispute 
whether the charges arose out of the same transaction.16 
“Same transaction” means “conduct consisting of a series of 
acts or omissions that are motivated by . . . a purpose to 
accomplish a criminal objective and that are necessary or 
incidental to the accomplishment of that objective.”17 The parties 
disagree on whether a person who drives while under the influence 
can be motivated by a criminal objective, and, if so, whether 
careless driving in this instance shares the same criminal objective. 
                                                     
6 Id. at 2–3.  
7 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 2.  
8 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 4, at 3.  
9 Id.   
10 Id.  
11 Id.; MONT CONST. art. II, § 25; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–11–504(1) 
(2017). 
12 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 4.  
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 3.  
15 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–11–504(1); see also State v. Tadewaldt, 922 
P.2d 463, 465 (Mont. 1996). 
16 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 10.  
17 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–202(23)(a). 
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A. Defendant-Appellant O’Connell’s Argument 
 
Petitioner O’Connell claims both charges shared the same 
criminal objective: continuing to drive after suddenly becoming 
dizzy. Therefore, the DUI charge should be barred as arising from 
the same transaction.18 O’Connell describes two divergent 
approaches for analyzing whether charges arise from the same 
transaction: the conduct approach and the elements approach.19 
O’Connell asks the Court to adopt the conduct approach and 
overrule two cases O’Connell alleges utilize the elements 
approach.20 
Under the elements approach, the Court looks to the elements 
of the offenses—focusing specifically on the mental state—to 
determine whether the offenses shared the same “purpose, 
motivation, and criminal objective,” and thus arise from the “same 
transaction.”21 The Court has twice stated that because DUI does 
not have a mental state DUI cannot be motivated by a purpose to 
accomplish a criminal objective.22 Since DUI has no criminal 
objective, DUI cannot arise out of the same transaction as other 
offenses.23 O’Connell implicitly concedes that the Municipal 
Court’s denial of her motion to dismiss was correct under State v. 
Condo24 and State ex rel Booth v. Montana Twenty-First Judicial 
District.25 O’Connell asks the Court to overturn Condo and Booth 
as inconsistent with §§ 46–11–504(1) and 46–1–202(23)(a), and 
other case law utilizing the conduct approach.26  
O’Connell points to State v. James27 and State v. Cech28 as 
examples of the conduct approach.29 In James, the defendant drove 
100 miles per hour, passed other vehicles in no-passing zones, and 
eventually wrecked a vehicle while fleeing from officers.30 The 
defendant was charged and convicted of fleeing a police officer in 
tribal court and subsequently charged with criminal endangerment 
in state court.31 The Court concluded both charges arose from the 
                                                     
18 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 7.  
19 Id. at 6.  
20 Id. at 8. 
21 Id. at 19 (quoting State v. Condo, 182 P.3d 57, 60–61 (Mont. 2008)). 
22 Id. at 19–20 (citing Condo, 182 P.3d at 60–61; and State ex rel. 
Booth v. Montana Twenty-First Judicial District, 972 P.2d 325, 330 (1998)).  
23 Id. at 19–20. 
24 182 P.3d at 57. 
25 972 P.2d at 325; Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 1. 
26 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 8.  
27 237 P.3d 672 (Mont. 2010). 
28 167 P.3d 389 (Mont. 2007). 
29 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 12–14.  
30 Id. at 12; James, 237 P.3d at 674. 
31 James, 237 P.3d at 674. 
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same conduct—driving dangerously and at a high rate of speed to 
avoid capture.32 The Court noted the charges contained different 
elements, but concluded the different elements did not mean the 
charges arose from different transactions.33  
In Cech, the defendant test drove a car and never returned it.34 
Police recovered the car in Washington, and Washington charged 
and convicted the defendant of possessing stolen property in the 
first degree.35 Subsequently, a Montana court charged Cech with 
felony theft.36 The Court held the underlying conduct for both 
charges “sought to accomplish the same criminal objective–control 
of the stolen vehicle.”37 The Court held the felony theft charge 
violated Montana’s double jeopardy protections. 
O'Connell asserts that under the conduct test she satisfies the 
same transaction prong because she engaged in a single course of 
conduct: choosing to continue to drive after a sudden onset of 
dizziness.38 The crash was merely incidental to this decision.39 
 
B. Plaintiff-Appellee City of Helena’s Response 
 
The City of Helena asserts Booth, Cech, Condo, and James are 
not incompatible and opposes O’Connell’s assertion that they 
create different tests.40 The City of Helena maintains the Court 
analyzes a person’s conduct in conjunction with the crimes 
charged, and thus necessarily must sometimes look to the elements 
of the crimes to determine the criminal objective motivating the 
underlying conduct.41  
In Cech, the Court focused on the elements of the two charges, 
finding “Cech’s asserted motivations, that of ‘knowingly . . . 
withhold[ing] or appropriate[ing]’ the Honda ‘to the use of any 
person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto,’ 
R.C.W. § 9A.56.140, or of ‘depriving the owner of the property’ 
under § 45–6–301(1)(a)” were the same.42 
The City notes the Court in James looked to the elements of the 
crimes in acknowledging the fleeing charge was based on 
“knowingly fleeing from an Officer . . . by traveling at a high rate 
of speed and/or making improper passes,” and the criminal 
                                                     
32 Id. at 675. 
33 Id. 
34 167 P.3d at 390. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 394. 
38 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 34. 
39 Id. 
40 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 4, at 10. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 11–12 (quoting Cech, 167 P.3d at 394) (alterations in original).  
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endangerment charge was based on “passing in no passing zones 
and driving his vehicle at speeds up to 100 mph.”43  
The City of Helena also points to the Court’s express decision 
in Condo not to overrule Booth’s assertion that a criminal objective 
cannot motivate DUI.44 Because the Court’s cases can be read as 
consistent with each other, the City of Helena asserts that stare 
decisis provides the “preferred course.”45 
Even if the Court overturns Booth and Condo, the City of 
Helena maintains the careless driving and DUI charges did not 
arise from the same transaction.46A person is guilty of careless 
driving if she fails to drive in a “careful and prudent manner that 
does not unduly or unreasonably endanger . . . life, limb, [or] 
property.”47 By contrast, DUI requires a person under the influence 
of any drug “to drive or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle.”48 O’Connell committed the alleged offense of DUI as 
soon as she drove or was in actual physical control of the vehicle 
while under the influence.49 By contrast, officers cited O’Connell 
with careless driving for colliding with several vehicles.50 The City 
contends these were two separate transactions: the first transaction 
occurred once O’Connell got behind the wheel under the influence 
of drugs, and the second occurred when she crashed into the other 
vehicles.51 
 
C. Defendant-Appellant O’Connell’s Reply 
 
O'Connell maintains that just because DUI does not require the 
prosecutor to prove a mental state element does not mean there is 
no criminal objective.52 O’Connell cites to the Court’s assertion in 
State v. Glass53 that even though simple possession does not 
require the State to prove what a defendant intends to do with a 
dangerous drug he possesses, this does not mean the defendant has 
no criminal objective in possessing the dangerous drug.54 
O’Connell highlights the discrepancy between State v. Couture55 
                                                     
43 Id. at 12 (quoting James, 237 P.3d at 674).  
44 Id. at 16–17; Condo, 182 P.3d at 59. 
45 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting State v. 
Kirkbride 185 P.3d 340, 343 (Mont. 2008)). 
46 Id. at 19.  
47 Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 61–8–302(1) (2017)).  
48 Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 61–8–401(1)(c) (2017)). 
49 Id.   
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, City of Helena v. O’Connell, 
https://perma.cc/39MK-6FTC (Mont. Oct. 15, 2018) (No. DA 17-0061). 
53 359 P.3d 469 (Mont. 2017). 
54 Id. at 472. 
55 959 P.2d 948 (Mont. 1998). 
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and State v. Tadewaldt,56 which identify a criminal objective for 
DUI, and Booth and Condo, which conversely state that strict 
liability offenses such as DUI cannot be motivated by a criminal 
objective.57 
Additionally, O’Connell asserts stare decisis serves to protect 
stability and predictability, but the Court's application of the “same 
transaction” is neither predictable nor stable. Therefore, the Court 
should overturn Booth and Condo.58 
Finally, O’Connell maintains the singular conduct of 
continuing to drive after a sudden onset of dizziness underlies both 
offenses.59 O’Connell concedes separate criminal objectives might 
conceivably motivate defendants who drive under the influence for 
a significant period of time before causing an accident, but asserts 
both DUI and careless charges share the same criminal objective 
when impairment and an accident occur contemporaneously.60 
O’Connell also forcefully opposes the characterization that she 
“got behind the wheel under the influence of drugs” because the 




The Court previously concluded strict liability offenses can be 
motivated by a criminal objective, but more recently stated that if 
there is no mental state, there is no criminal objective.62 The Court 
should reconsider this assertion. If the Court upholds that strict 
liability offenses cannot be motivated by a criminal objective and, 
therefore, are not subject to double-jeopardy prohibitions, the 
Court will effectively condone jurisdictions subsequently 
prosecuting any strict liability offense regardless of the underlying 
                                                     
56 922 P.2d 463 (Mont. 1996). 
57 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 52, at 5.  
58 Id. at 9. 
59 Id. at 7. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 13.  
62 Condo, 182 P.3d at 60 (Because DUI is a strict liability offense that 
does not require proof of mental state and negligent vehicular assault requires 
proof of a negligent mental state the two offenses cannot be motivate by a 
purpose to accomplish the same criminal objective.); Couture, 959 P.2d at 950 
(“Couture’s driving without a license and without proof of insurance was 
unrelated to his criminal objective of DUI—ingesting alcohol and driving a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.”); Booth, 972 P.2d at 330 
(“Booth’s conduct of drinking alcohol and then driving his vehicle was ‘not 
motivated by a purpose to accomplish a criminal objective.’”); Tadewaldt, 922 
P.2d at 466 (95) (“Tadewaldt’s conduct in possessing the dangerous drugs was 
not motivated by a purpose to accomplish the ‘criminal objective’ of DUI, nor 
was it necessary or incidental to that ‘objective.’”). 
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conduct. However, the Court already considered a nearly identical 
argument in Condo and chose not to overrule Booth.63 
Even if the Court overturns Booth and Condo, O’Connell 
cannot prevail unless the Court agrees the careless driving charge 
and the DUI charge share conduct motivated by the sole criminal 
objective of continuing to drive after a sudden onset of dizziness. 
The Court will likely find O’Connell’s decision to drive while 
under the influence of prescription medication was separate from 
her driving decisions immediately before the accident. 
O’Connell asserts a person who drives under the influence and 
also causes an accident may be motivated by two different criminal 
objectives, but only if a significant amount of time passes between 
the two incidents.64 At its core, O’Connell’s hypothetical describes 
separate conduct—that of driving under the influence and improper 
driving decisions—separated by an expanse of time. O’Connell 
asserts that because she suddenly became impaired immediately 
before the crash, both the DUI and the careless driving were 
motivated by the purpose to accomplish the same criminal 
objective of continuing to drive after a sudden onset of dizziness.65  
O’Connell’s assertion that a person must drive a significant 
distance prior to causing an accident in order for the two offenses 
to arise from different transactions frames the question of how 
much time must pass. A person commits the offense of DUI as 
soon as she drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle while 
her ability to safely operate a vehicle has been diminished by drugs 
or alcohol.66 The Court will likely view O’Connell’s decision to 
drive while impaired by prescription medication as separate from 
the driving decisions that caused the accident. O’Connell missed a 
turn and while attempting to find a place to turn around, she 
crashed into several other vehicles.67 O’Connell’s conduct 
underlying the DUI was operating a vehicle while under the 
influence of prescription drugs—conduct occurring prior to the 
crash.  
 If the Court chooses to overturn Booth and Condo and find 
strict liability offenses may be motivated by a purpose to 
accomplish a criminal objective, the Court will have to identify the 
specific conduct underlying both offenses to determine if both 
were motivated by the same criminal objective. Ultimately, 
O’Connell is unlikely to prevail on her double-jeopardy claim. The 
more consequential question left for the Court is whether 
O’Connell’s claim fails because DUI is a strict liability offense or 
                                                     
63 Condo, 182 P.3d at 59. 
64 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 52, at 15.  
65 Id. 
66 Mont. Code Ann. § 61–8–401(1), (3)(a) (2017). 
67 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 4, at 2.  
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because different conduct with different criminal objectives 




O’Connell’s case provides the Court the opportunity to clarify 
whether strict liability offenses such as DUI are motivated by a 
purpose to accomplish a criminal objective, and thus may trigger 
double-jeopardy protections. If the Court upholds Booth’s and 
Condo’s assertion that because there is no mental state, there is no 
criminal objective, then all strict liability crimes may be brought 
subsequent to conviction or acquittal without violating Montana’s 
double-jeopardy statute. Such a holding would significantly limit 
double-jeopardy protections by removing any offense without a 
mental state from the scope of the statutory protections. If the 
Court determines strict liability offenses can have a criminal 
objective, the Court must identify O’Connell’s conduct underlying 
both charges and determine if both offenses were motivated by the 
purpose to continue driving after a sudden onset of dizziness. 
 
